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COMMENT
International Law: Valdez v. State of Oklahoma and the
Application of International Law in Oklahoma*

L Introduction
"This court has before it a unique and serious matter involving novel legal
issues and international law."' The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
chose these words to describe Valdez v. State of Oklahoma,2 a case in which
a Mexican national argued for postconviction relief from the death penalty on
the basis of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR),3 to which the United States is a party. Significantly, Valdez made
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals one of the first state courts to
address Article 36 since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided
4 in which the ICJ interpreted
Germany v. UnitedStates ofAmerica (LaGrand),
the controversial provision.
Briefly stated, Article 36 grants foreign nationals the right to contact their
consulate if they are arrested or detained in a foreign country.5 Such
notification allows the consulate to provide legal assistance to the foreign
national, who may speak another language or be unfamiliar with the foreign
nation's legal system. As might be expected, local authorities sometimes fail
to comply with Article 36. In the United States, such failures have prompted
foreign nationals to file appeals based on what they consider to be a judicially
enforceable right created by Article 36. However, U.S. courts have dismissed
such appeals on the basis that Article 36 fails to create an individual,

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.
The author would like to thank his wife for her patience and support and Professor Peter
F. Krug for his advice and encouragement.
1. John Greiner, Mexican National Granted Indefinite Stay of Execution, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11, 2001, at IA.
2. 2002 OK CR 20, 46 P.3d 703 (Valdez 11).
3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,596 U.N.T.S.
262 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
4. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. (June 27), at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/
idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
5. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292,
294.
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judicially enforceable right.6 Furthermore, procedural default rules often
prevent courts from reviewing Article 36 claims because the foreign national
fails to raise the issue at the trial level or in prior appeals.7 An obvious "catch22" results: foreign nationals cannot raise timely Article 36 claims if they are
not notified of their Article 36 rights until after trial.
Gerardo Valdez confronted Oklahoma's procedural default rule in Valdez
when he asserted his Article 36 rights before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals.8 In asserting his rights, Valdez benefitted from the LaGrand
decision, in which the ICJ interpreted Article 36 as (1) conveying an
individual, judicially enforceable right to foreign nationals and (2) barring the
use of the procedural default rule to prevent a court from reviewing a
challenge to a conviction or sentence.9 Valdez relied primarily on LaGrand
and argued that its interpretation was binding on the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals."° The court rejected Valdez' arguments," citing a 1998
U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the application of the federal
procedural default rule in adjudicating Article 36 claims.' 2
The Valdez decision contributes to the overarching issue of how
international law, or, as in this case, a decision by an international tribunal,
becomes part of domestic law. To address the question, we must first look to
our domestic system and determine to what extent it allows the incorporation
of international law. In the U.S. federalist system, this issue becomes more
complex. We must consider how an individual state should address a question
of international law that has not been conclusively determined at the federal
level, and the role state sovereignty plays. Furthermore, we must consider
whether a state court has the authority to give judicial deference to an ICJ
decision or incorporate international law into its state constitution.
This comment focuses on the aspects of international law presented by
Valdez. It first seeks to explain Valdez' contentions and the court's reasoning
for ultimately rejecting them. Second, it comments on the future possibilities
of addressing Article 36 in Oklahoma as an individual state within the federal
system. To do so, some background is first necessary. Therefore, Part II
describes Article 36 and its pertinent provisions. Parts III, IV, and V explain
the law prior to Valdez at the federal, state, and international levels. Part VI
provides a statement of the Valdez case followed by an analysis of the court's
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.D.
Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, 110, 46 P.3d 703, 706 (Valdez II).
See infra Part V.B.2.
Valdez II, 1 10, 46 P.3d at 706.
Id. 23, 46 P.3d at 709.
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-79 (1998).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/23

2003]

COMMENT

reasoning in Part VII. Finally, Part VIII addresses the future of Article 36 in
Oklahoma. Parts IX and X conclude with policy implications and recent
developments.
Before moving on, it is important to note that Valdez' significance lies in
its adjudication at the state level. If Article 36 is to have substantial impact
on foreign nationals in the future, this effect must occur at the state level.
Indeed, state sovereignty may provide the best avenue for addressing the issue.
II. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations
In 1969 the United States ratified the VCCR, 3 which established a
framework for the exercise of consular functions in foreign States and sought
to "contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations."' 4
Article 36 is one of several provisions that govern the manner in which the
host nation, or receiving State, interacts with the foreign nation, or sending
State, and its nationals. 15Paragraph 1(a) delineates the general freedoms that
the consulate and its nationals enjoy, stating that "consular officers shall be
free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to
them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect
to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State." 16
Article 36 also specifically addresses the "rights" of the foreign nationals
when arrested or detained by the receiving State. Article 36, Paragraph l(b)
states:
[I]f [the foreign national] so requests, the competent authorities of
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post
of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed
to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or
detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without
delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph."'

13.
for the
14.
15.
16.
17.

Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Conventionon ConsularRelations: A Search
Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 565, 568 (1997).
Vienna Convention, supra note 3, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262.
See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 3.
Id. art. 36(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
Id. art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292 (emphasis added).
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The court in Valdez tackled the controversial question of whether Article 36,
paragraph 1(b) creates an18individualright so that foreign nationals may invoke
Article 36 rights at trial.
Article 36 also addresses the rights of the foreign consulate. Paragraph 1(c)
provides that consular officers shall have the right to visit and communicate
with nationals of the sending State in custody and to arrange for their legal
representation.' 9 However, Article 36 clearly provides that the consulate
should not take such action if the foreign national "expressly opposes such
action.""
The question remains as to how foreign nationals' Article 36 rights should
be protected in the receiving State. Paragraph 2 of the Article requires that
these rights are to be carried out "in conformity with the laws and regulations
of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposesfor which the
rights accordedunder this Article are intended."'', This provision has played
a key role in the application of procedural default rules to bar Article 36
claims in the United States. However, the ICJ has interpreted this same
provision to bar use of procedural default rules when they prevent foreign
nationals from challenging their convictions or sentences. Parts 111, IV, and
V discuss these differing interpretations in the context of federal, state, and
international law prior to Valdez.
II. FederalLaw Priorto Valdez
This part focuses on the U.S. federal interpretation of Article 36 and
explains the majority view where one exists. It is subdivided into the major
principles that direct application of Article 36 in the United States.
A. The VCCR Is a Self-Executing Treaty and Is Directly Applicable to
Federal,State, and Local Governments
The VCCR is a self-executing treaty.2 2 Generally, self-executing treaties
carry two connotations in the United States. 23 First, self-executing treaties
apply directly to domestic legal systems, thereby becoming binding domestic

18. Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, 1 22, 46 P.3d 703, 709 (Valdez II).
19. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 101,596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
20. Id.
21. Id. art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292, 294 (emphasis added).
22. S. EXEC. REP. No. 91-9, app. at 5 (1969).
23. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996) (stating that
"[t]he term 'self-executing' has two distinct meanings in international law").
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law without any congressional implementation.24 Second, courts often
interpret self-executing treaties as conferring enforceable individual rights on
private citizens.25
However, both characteristics cannot always be assumed with regard to
self-executing treaties. Indeed, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
asserts that deeming a treaty self-executing is different from deeming the
treaty one that creates individual rights.26 Therefore, a self-executing treaty
applies directly to domestic law but fails to necessarily create judicially
enforceable individual rights.
There seems to be no question that the VCCR is a self-executing treaty in
the sense that it is directly applicable - creating binding obligations upon the
United States without any congressional implementation. Senate Executive
Report 91-9, which recommended that the Senate ratify the VCCR, states in
its appendix that the VCCR is self-executing and does not require any
congressional implementation or additional legislation.2 7 In addition to case
law,28 State Department documents provide further evidence of the VCCR's
self-executing nature. In 1998, the State Department published a manual for
police use entitled "Consular Access and Notification," in which it addressed
the U.S. obligations to foreign nationals.2 9 Part Five of the manual also makes
clear that the VCCR is self-executing and can be carried out through existing
powers of the "executive, law enforcement, and judicial authorities."3 In
24. Self-executing treaties
are able to operate automatically within the domestic sphere, without the need for
any municipal legislation, while the [non-self-executing treaties] require enabling
acts before they can function inside the country and bind the American courts.
Self-executing treaties apply directly within the United States as part of the
supreme law of the land, whereas those conventions deemed not self-executing are
obliged to undergo a legislative transformation and until they do so they cannot
be regarded as legally enforceable against American citizens or institutions.
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (1991).
25. Republic ofParaguay,949 F. Supp. at 1274 (stating that "the term 'self-executing' also
denotes a treaty that confers rights of action on private individuals").
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 11 cmt. h (1987).
27. S. EXEC. REP. No. 91-9, app. at 1, 5.

28. United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 n.1 (C.D. Ill. 1999)
(Chaparro-Alcantara1)(stating that "[t]he parties do not dispute that the Vienna Convention
is a 'self-executing' document - the treaty has the force of law without enabling legislation");
Republic of Paraguay,949 F. Supp. at 1274 (stating that the VCCR is self-executing in the
sense that it "does not require implementing legislation before becoming federal law").
29. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS: INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FEDERAL, STATE, AND OTHER LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS REGARDING
FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHTS OFCONSULAR OFFICIALS TO ASSIST

THEM (1998), http://www.travel.state.gov/consul-notify.html.
30. Id. pt. 5.
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addition, the document clearly states that the VCCR obligations bind federal,
state, and local governments under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.3 Therefore, Oklahoma must comply with Article 36.
B. Individual Rights Under the VCCR - No ClearAnswer
While the VCCR clearly applies directly to the United States, the
controversial question remains whether Article 36 creates enforceable
individual rights.32 Caselaw runs the spectrum from denying any possibility
of individual rights33 to holding that Article 36 confers individual rights.34
Somewhere in the middle stands a wide array of cases that considers foreign
citizens' Article 36 claims, thereby assuming that the citizens possess an
individual right, but never directly resolving the issue.35
Despite this confusion, the State Department maintains a clear position. In
August 1999, the First Circuit, with regard to United States v. Li,36 requested
the State Department's opinion on whether the VCCR creates individual,

31. Id.
32. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1stCir. 2000) ("Those courts that have faced the
issues before us have come to divergent conclusions as to whether the Vienna Convention...
bestow[s] any rights upon individuals, as opposed to states.").
33. Republic of Paraguay, 949 F. Supp. at 1274 (stating that the VCCR is not selfexecuting in the sense that it "confers rights of action on private individuals").
34. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring) ("The
Vienna Convention is a self-executing treaty - it provides rights to individuals rather than
merely setting out the obligations of signatories. The text emphasizes that the right of consular
notice and assistance is the citizen's.") (citations omitted); Standt v. City of New York, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("In sum, the language of the VCCR, coupled with its
'legislative history' and subsequent operation, suggest that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
was intended to provide a private right of action to individuals detained by foreign officials.");
United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. 111. 1999) (ChaparroAlcantara 1) (holding that "[defendants] have an individual right to consular notification under
Article 36 which in turn grants them standing to object to a violation of that provision").
35. United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2000) (ChaparroAlcantara I1) ("It is sufficient for present purposes to assume that such an individual right is
created by the Convention .... "); Chapparro-AlcantaraI, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (citing
Villafuerte v. Stewart, 142 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) (entertaining a claim of a violation of the
Convention without discussing the standing issue); United States v. Salas, No. 98-4374, 1998
WL 911731, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1998) (same); Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th
Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
(same); Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996) (same); Mami v. Van
Zandt, No. 89-CIV-0554 (TPG), 1989 WL 52308, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1989) (same)).
36. 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
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judicially enforceable rights.37 The State Department unequivocally
answered: "[t]he VCCR ...establish[es] state-to-state ights ....They are
not treaties establishing rights of individuals. The right of an individual to
communicate with his consular officials is derivative of the sending state's
right to extend consular protection to its nationals when consular relations
exist between the states concerned. 38 Thus, the State Department has
interpreted Article 36 as providing no judicial remedy to foreign nationals
when U.S. authorities fail to comply with it. Of course, this interpretation
works against foreign nationals such as Valdez, who base their appeals on the
Article.
C. The VCCR Does Not Create U.S. ConstitutionalRights: Murphy v.
Netherland
Clearly, the U.S. federal government has been extremely reluctant to
conclude that Article 36 creates individual rights for foreign nationals.Likewise, federal courts have clearly stated that Article 36 fails to create a
right under the U.S. Constitution. In Murphy v. Netherland,39 the Fourth
Circuit convicted a Mexican national of murder-for-hire and conspiracy to
commit capital murder and sentenced him to death in Virginia.4" Per writ of
habeas corpus in federal court, Murphy raised for the first time the claim that
he was never notified of his Article 36 rights.4 ' The Eastern District of
Virginia held the claim procedurally barred because Murphy failed to raise it
in state court.4 2 Thereafter, Murphy filed with the court for a certificate of
37. Letter from State Department, to James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice 1 (Oct. 15, 1999), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
7111.doc.
38. Id. attachment A.A-1. Attachment A, subsection 1, in response to question 1 supplies
"the State Department's exact position on the question whether such treaties may be invoked
by defendants in criminal cases." Id. attachment A.A-I. The State Department also replied,
The incidental reference to individual rights in Article 36 of the VCCR... is not
intended to imply the existence of ajudicially enforceable individual right that can
be raised by the individual as a basis for relief in the context of a country's
criminal justice system. Looking at the text of the VCCR, its negotiating history,
and the practice of states under the VCCR (i.e., looking at the accepted tools of
treaty interpretation), we see no intent to change the criminal justice processes of
the member states, much less to create individual rights that would require the
suppression of evidence (a remedy that is not common to criminal justice systems
outside the United States).
Id. attachment A.A-4.
39. 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997).
40. Id. at 98.
41. Id. at99.
42. Id.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
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appealability, which is required for appeal after a denial of habeas corpus
43
relief.
To receive certificates of appealability, petitioners must show a substantial
denial of constitutional rights.' The Fourth Circuit held that, regardless of
whether the VCCR creates individual rights, it absolutely fails to create
constitutionalrights.45 Furthermore, equating treaty law with federal statutory
law, the court reasoned that just as a state's violation of a federal statute does
not violate the federal constitution, a state's violation of a treaty does not
equate to a violation of a constitutional right. 46 Therefore, because Murphy
failed to show even the existence of a constitutional right under Article 36, the
court held that he had failed to substantially demonstrate the denial of a
constitutional right.47 This holding has precluded the granting of such
constitutional remedies as suppression of evidence or dismissal of an
indictment at the federal level to foreign nationals when they have asserted
their Article 36 rights.
D. Breardv. Greene: Article 36 Is Subject to the ProceduralDefault Rule
Clearly, foreign nationals face a difficult task in attempting to assert Article
36 as grounds for appellate relief. U.S. courts question the very validity of
claiming Article 36 rights and refuse to grant any constitutional remedies
when violations occur. However, the procedural default rule, which prevents
an individual from raising a new claim when he could have done so in earlier
proceedings, has proven to be the greatest hurdle in asserting Article 36
protection at the state or federal level. At the federal level, the rule bars
consideration of Article 36 claims when foreign nationals fail to raise such
claims at trial or in state court. However, the conflict between the rule and
Article 36 is readily apparent in the language of the Article, which provides
that whatever rights are created by Article 36 are to be carried out "in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State" as long as
those laws and regulations give "full effect" to Article 36.48 In confronting
this issue in Breard v. Greene,4 9 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld application
of the federal procedural default rule to Article 36 claims.5 "
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
294.
49.
50.

See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1994)).
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (1994)).
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100.
Id.
See id. at 99-100.
Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292,
523 U.S. 371 (1998).
Id. at 375-76.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/23

COMMENT

2003]

At the federal level, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Federal Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA),5" implements the rule by requiring the denial of a writ of
habeas corpus unless the applicant has exhausted available state remedies.5"
Specifically, in the case where an individual raises an entirely new factual
claim such as an Article 36 claim, § 2254 prohibits an evidentiary hearing
unless the individual can show (1) a new constitutional rule upon which the
claim is based, or (2) "a factual predicate that could not have been previously
' 53
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Despite its seeming strictness, the procedural default rule is not absolute.54
Regardless of § 2254, federal courts may consider a claim if the individual can
show (1) "cause for the default," and (2) "actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law."55 Alternatively, federal courts may consider
a procedurally defaulted claim if the individual can show that "failure to
consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice."56
In Breardv. Netherland,the federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia
applied § 2254 in considering the conviction of Angel Breard, a Paraguay
citizen. In 1994, the Virginia Supreme Court had affirmed Breard's firstdegree murder conviction and death sentence.57 Per writ of habeas corpus,
Breard sought federal relief, where he raised for the first time his claim that
Virginia officials had failed to notify him of his Article 36 rights.58 Applying
§ 2254, the federal court held that Breard had procedurally defaulted on his
claim because he had failed to raise it in state court.5 9 Furthermore, the court
held that Breard could not show cause for the default.6' The Fourth Circuit
affirmed,6 and Breard sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme
62

Court.

51. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104,
110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000).
53. Id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). In addition, § 2254 requires the individual to show that "the
facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of
the underlying offense." Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
54. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996).
55. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).
56. Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750).
57. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994).
58. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. at 1263.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court held that Virginia's "failure to comply with the Vienna Convention did
not prevent Breard's counsel from raising the issue during state proceedings." Id.
61. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1998).
62. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998).
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In an attempt to circumvent the procedural default rule, Breard argued
before the Court that the VCCR trumps the procedural default rule because the
former is the supreme law of the land.63 The Court rejected this argument for
two reasons.' First, the Court held that international law recognizes that a
state's procedural rules govern a treaty's implementation in that state, unless
the treaty expressly provides to the contrary. Furthermore, the Court cited
Article 36, paragraph 2 for the specific assertion that rights under the Article
should be implemented according to forum state law.66 Second, the Court
reasoned that U.S. treaties have no greater status than constitutional provisions
or congressional acts, and that the procedural default rule applies to both.67
The Court stated that "an Act of Congress ... is on a full parity with a treaty,
and ... when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null. 68
Applying this later-in-time rule to Breard's case, the Court noted that the
U.S. ratified the VCCR in 1969 but that in 1996 Congress enacted the AEDPA
and amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254.69 Because the Court observed that Congress
had enacted the AEDPA subsequent to ratification of the VCCR and prior to
Breard filing his claim, the Court held that § 2254 could bar a claim based on
the violation of Article 36 rights.7" Therefore, the Court held that the VCCR
fails to trump the federal procedural default rule and that Breard's claim was
procedurally defaulted. 7'
In addition, the Court reasoned that, even if Breard had properly established
the VCCR violation, he could not have shown that the violation had any
impact on the trial's outcome because he had pled not guilty and testified at
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Court stated:
This proposition is embodied in the Vienna Convention itself, which provides that
the rights expressed in the Convention "shall be exercised in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State," provided that "said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended."
Id. (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. at 101,596 U.N.T.S. at 292,
294).
67. Id. at 376.
68. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)).
69. Id.
70. Id. The Court stated: "Breard's ability to obtain relief based on violations of the
Vienna Convention is subject to this subsequently enacted rule, just as any claim arising under
the United States Constitution would be. This rule prevents Breard from establishing that the
violation of his Vienna Convention rights prejudiced him." Id.
71. Id. at 375-76.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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his trial against advice of counsel.72 The Court found any assertion that
VCCR compliance would have affected Breard's actions at trial to be more
speculative than prejudice claims courts consistently reject.73
IV. Oklahoma Law Priorto Valdez
In line with the federal courts, Oklahoma courts have not granted Article
36 relief. Oklahoma's Article 36 jurisprudence consists only of three
appellate decisions from the late 1990s in which the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals consistently denied postconviction relief or reversal.
Significantly, the courts issued these decisions prior to LaGrand,a decision
which Valdez relied upon heavily.74
A. Al-Mosawi v. State of Oklahoma
In Al-Mosawi v. State of Oklahoma,7" the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals indirectly addressed the VCCR. In this decision, the court convicted
Al-Mosawi, an Iraqi national, of first-degree murder and sentenced him to
death.76 Al-Mosawi applied for postconviction relief,77 asserting that his
appellate counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise the State's violation
of his VCCR rights.78 Specifically, he contended that the State failed to notify
him of his right to contact the Iraqi consulate. 79 Deciding the case in March
1998 prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Breard v. Greene, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that his counsel's conduct was not
"unreasonable under prevailing professional norms," reasoning that there is
"no obligation to raise all available non-frivolous issues., 81
B. Martinez v. State of Oklahoma
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals dealt more directly with Article
36 of the VCCR in Martinez v. State of Oklahoma.8 Martinez, a Cuban
national, directly appealed both his first-degree murder conviction and death
sentence.82 Among the several grounds that he asserted for reversal, Martinez
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 377.
Id.
Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20,
1998 OK CR 18, 956 P.2d 906.
Id. , 956 P.2d at 908.
Id.
Id. 4, 956 P.2d at 909.
Id. 4 n.6, 956 P.2d at 909 n.6.
Id. 5, 956 P.2d at 909.
1999 OK CR 33, 984 P.2d 813.
Id.11, 984 P.2d at 817.

10, 12, 46 P.3d 703, 706-07 (Valdez I1).
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claimed that the State violated his Article 36 rights because it should have
applied the VCCR as the supreme law of the land.8 3 Citing Breard v. Greene,
the court denied Martinez' claim because he had failed to show that he
attempted to exercise his Article 36 rights, failed to raise the issue at trial, and
failed to show prejudice as a result of the violation.'
C. Flores v. State of Oklahoma
In Flores v. State of Oklahoma,85 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
directly addressed Article 36 in the context of Flores' contentions for
exclusion of evidence because of an Article 36 violation.86 Flores, a Mexican
national, directly appealed his first-degree murder conviction and death
sentence.8 7 Specifically, Flores contended that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence gathered during his arrest and subsequent police statement,
during which the State failed to inform Flores of his Article 36 rights.88
Applying Breardand Murphy, the court equated violation of a treaty with
violation of a federal statute and reasoned that relief could be granted only if
(1) a statutory violation were shown and (2) prejudice resulted from the
violation.89 Despite the existence of an Article 36 violation, the court denied
reversal because Fores failed to show prejudice resulting from this lack of
notification. 90 The court based this finding on Flores' failure to show that he
misunderstood his Mirandarights or the nature of his arrest.9 Furthermore,
the court found that Flores failed to show that he would have acted differently
or would have received greater protection if he had been advised of his right
to contact the Mexican consular post regarding his arrest. 92
In the above cases, the court of criminal appeals applied only state law and
granted petitioners no relief under Article 36. However, LaGrand opened a
new door for the more concrete assertion that foreign nationals do have
83. Id. 1 6, 984 P.2d at 818.
84. Id. 9, 984 P.2d at 819.
85. 1999 OK CR 52, 994 P.2d 782.
86. Id. 14, 994 P.2d at 785.
87. Id. 1 1, 994 P.2d at 783.
88. Id. 1 14,994 P.2d at 785. Based in part on the Article 36 violations, Flores filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence gathered at the time of his arrest. Furthermore, Flores
objected to the evidence at trial. Id. 15, 994 P.2d at 785-86.
89. Id. [i 17-18, 994 P.2d at 786. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Breardv. Greene for the assertion that "[a]cts of Congress are on full parity with treaties"; the
court cited Murphy for the assertion that "rights under a treaty and rights under a federal statute
are not the equivalent of constitutional rights." Id. 17, 994 P.2d at 786.
90. Id. 19, 994 P.2d at 786.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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individual rights to consular assistance and that procedural default rules
cannot interfere when these rights are violated.
V. InternationalLaw Priorto Valdez
In 1999 and 2001, respectively, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(ICHR) and the ICJ - two international tribunals - interpreted Article 36.
This part provides a synopsis of their interpretations, focusing on the ICJ's
decision in LaGrandthat Valdez relied upon so heavily before the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals. Both of these courts interpreted Article 36
contrary to federal case law and the State Department's position.
A. Inter-American Court of Human Rights
In 1999, at the request of the United Mexican States, the ICHR issued an
advisory opinion entitled "The Right to Information on Consular Assistance
in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law." 93 The Court
rendered three holdings pertinent to Valdez. First, the Court ruled that Article
36 confers the individual rights of consular communication and information
upon arrested foreign detainees94 and that these rights are individually
enforceable in State courts without the sending State's involvement. 95 The
Court recognized that its interpretation constituted a departure from traditional
State-to-State notions of international law but reasoned that Article 36 clearly
establishes such rights.96 Furthermore, the Court concluded that, while the
VCCR's preamble states that it is not meant "to benefit individuals, '97 this
language referred only to those individuals performing consular functions 98
and did not preclude the existence of individual rights. Second, the Court
ruled that Article 36 forms part of the minimum due process guarantees
established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) 99 in Article 14.'0° By connecting Article 36 to the ICCPR, the Court
explicitly linked the Article to human rights law.'0 ' Third, the Court held that
when a State fails to comply with Article 36 requirements, two major
93. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 487, OEA/ser. L./V/III.47, doc. 6

(2000).
94. Id. 1 82, 84.
95. Id. T189,97.

96. Id. 180.
97. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262.
98. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 487, 1 74.

99. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
100. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 487, JR 122, 124.

101. Id. 109.
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consequences occur: (1) prejudice to due process guarantees,' 02 and (2) if the
arresting state imposes the death penalty, a "violation of the right not to be
'arbitrarily' deprived of one's life" as described in Article 6 of the ICCPR.'03
Thus, the ICHR provided further grounds for foreign nationals to argue that
Article 36 creates individual, judicially enforceable rights. Furthermore, by
connecting Article 36 to due process rights, the court seemed to provide an
avenue for petitioners in the United States to claim the traditional remedies of
suppression of evidence or dismissal of an indictment. Despite the clear
relevance of the ICHR opinion, Valdez relied primarily on the ICJ's decision
in LaGrand.Unlike the ICHR advisory opinion, with LaGrand,the ICJ issued
an actual judgment binding on the United States. The Valdez court had to
decide just how binding LaGrand truly was.
B. The InternationalCourt of Justice: The LaGrandCase
In 2001, the ICJ interpreted Article 36, ruling that it confers individual
rights and that procedural default rules cannot bar consideration of Article 36
claims. As such, the ICJ's decision directly conflicts with the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Breardv. Greene, forming a major point of contention in
Valdez.
1. Facts and ProceduralHistory
The LaGrand case involved the first-degree murder convictions of two
German nationals in Arizona. The failure of local authorities to notify the
German nationals of their Article 36 rights sparked not only a series of federal
appeals, but also an international dispute between the United States and
Germany that the ICJ ultimately resolved. LaGrandwas pivotal for Valdez,
who relied heavily upon it before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
which became one of the first courts - state or federal - to consider the
decision.
In Lagrand,Walter and Karl LaGrand, German nationals, were convicted
of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona." After being
denied habeas corpus relief in federal district court, the LaGrand brothers
appealed to the Ninth Circuit,0 5 where they raised for the first time the claim
that Arizona officials failed to notify them of their Article 36 rights. 10 6 The
Ninth Circuit held that, although it was undisputed that Arizona failed to
102.
103.
104.
1987).
105.
106.

Id. 137.
Id. (quoting ICCPR, supra note 99, art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174).
State v. LaGrand, 733 P.2d 1066 (Ariz. 1987); State v. LaGrand, 734 P,2d 563 (Ariz.
LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995).
LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
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notify them of their Article 36 rights, the claim was procedurally defaulted
because they failed to raise it in any state proceeding.' 7 Furthermore, the
court held that the LaGrands could not show sufficient cause for not applying
the procedural default rule nor could they sufficiently show actual prejudice
resulting from the Article 36 violation." 8
Despite Germany's efforts to stay Karl LaGrand's execution, Arizona
executed him on February 24, 1999.09 On March 2, 1999, Germany filed an
action against the United States in the ICJ seeking the issuance of a
provisional measure to stay Walter LaGrand' s execution scheduled for March
3, 1999.'' On March 3, 1999, the ICJ issued the requested provisional
measure, stating that "[tihe United States of America should take all measures
at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final
decision in these proceedings.""' On the same day, Germany also filed an
action in the U.S. Supreme Court to enforce the provisional measure against
the United States and the Governor of Arizona.' 2 However, the Supreme
Court denied the relief due to "tardiness of the pleas and the jurisdictional
barriers they implicate."' 3 The Arizona governor allowed the execution to
proceed, and the State executed Walter LaGrand.
On June 27, 2001, the ICJ decided LaGrand."4 In the case, Germany
sought three declarations pertinent to Valdez. First, Germany argued that the
United States violated international legal obligations under Article 36 of the
VCCR by failing to notify the LaGrand brothers of their Article 36 rights."'
Second, Germany argued that the United States violated Article 36 by
applying domestic law in such a way as to thwart the fully intended effect of
107. Id. at 1261.
108. Id. at 1261-62.
109. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J., 126 (June 27), at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm. Germany's opposition was based on its general opposition
to capital punishment and the Article 36 violation. Id.
110. Id. 30.
111. Id.132.
112. Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111 (1999).
113. Id. at 112. In regard to Germany's action against the United States to enforce the ICJ's
provisional measure, the Court reasoned that "the United States [had] not waived its sovereign
immunity." Id. Furthermore, the Court stated that "[i]t is doubtful that Art. III, § 2, cl. 2,
provides an anchor for an action to prevent execution of a German citizen who is not an
ambassador or consul." Id. In regard to Germany's action against the Governor of Arizona, the
court reasoned that "a foreign government's ability here to assert a claim against a State is
without evident support in the Vienna Convention and in probable contravention of Eleventh
Amendment principles." Id.
114. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. (June 27), at http://ww.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/
igusframe.htm
115. Id. 112.
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Article 36 rights. 1 6 Third, Germany sought a declaration from the ICJ
requiring the United States to provide assurances that it would not repeat such
violations and that in future death penalty cases, it would "provide effective
review of and remedies for criminal convictions impaired by a violation of the
rights under Article 36."' 17
2. The ICJ's Holdings
First, the ICJ held that the United States violated Article 36 of the VCCR
in failing to notify the LaGrands of their rights and that no prejudice must be
shown for a state to violate Article 36."'8 The court found that Article 36
creates individual rights and that the LaGrand brothers' rights had been
violated. " 9 Of course, this statement was critical to Article 36 claimants in
U.S. courts because courts prior to LaGrand had failed to provide a clear
answer on this issue. Furthermore, in theory this holding granted foreign
nationals the right to invoke Article 36 before domestic courts.
Second, the court held that "[u]nder these circumstances," the United
States' application of the procedural default rule undermined the full effect of
the rights granted under Article 36, thereby violating paragraph 2 of Article
36.120 The court reasoned that the application of the rule "prevented [the
Ninth Circuit] from attaching any legal significance to the fact, interalia,that
the violation.., prevented Germany... from retaining private counsel...
and otherwise assisting in [the LaGrands'] defence as provided for by the
Convention." 12'However, the ICJ noted that the procedural default rule itself
does not violate Article 36, stating that
[t]he problem arises when the procedural default rule does not
allow the detained individual to challenge a conviction and
sentence by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the
Convention, that the competent national authorities failed to
comply with their obligation to provide the requisite consular
information "without delay," thus preventing the person from
seeking and obtaining consular assistance from the sending
22
State. 1

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. (N 74, 77.
Id. 77.
Id. 1 91 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. 190.
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Finally, the court held that in similar future cases, if the United States
breaches Article 36 obligations, it must "allow the review and reconsideration
of the conviction" in light of the United States' violation of Article 36 rights.
and "sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention."' 23 The court made clear that the method of such review is left
to the United States. 124 This begs the question whether the state clemency
proceedings provided for Valdez provided sufficient review and
reconsideration under LaGrand.
Clearly, the ICJ rulings contravened the decisions of Breardv. Greene and
LaGrandand thereby provided Valdez a new argument in seeking Article 36
relief. Valdez' reliance on the ICJ decision presented the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals with a complicated issue centering on the impact of ICJ
decisions in state courts.
VI. Statement of the Case: Valdez v. State of Oklahoma
Unlike previous decisions addressing Article 36 claims in Oklahoma,
Valdez presented the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals with LaGrand, a
decision contradictory to U.S. international case law. Therefore, the case
forced the court to decide not only the fate of Gerardo Valdez, but also the
difficult issue of how and to what extent the international legal system impacts
Oklahoma.
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
In April 1989, Gerardo Valdez, a Mexican citizen, murdered Juan Barron,
whom he had met in a bar. 25 The murder occurred when, after returning to
Valdez' home, Valdez threatened Barron with a gun and physically assaulted
him. 26 According to Valdez' testimony, Valdez believed homosexuality was
a sin, and he was attempting to "help Barron understand the error of his
ways. ",127 When Barron began fighting back, Valdez shot him twice in the
head, pistol-whipped him in the side of the head, and finally ended Barron's
' Valdez burned Barron' s body
life by slitting his throat with a kitchen knife. 28
in his backyard. 2 9

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. 125.
Id.
Valdez v. State, 1995 OK CR 18, 1 2, 900 P.2d 363, 368 (Valdez 1).
Id. 3, 900 P.2d at 368.
Id. 1 4, 900 P.2d at 368.
Id. 3, 900 P.2d at 368.
Id.
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On July 24, 1989, Oklahoma police searched Valdez' home pursuant to a
search warrant and read Valdez his Miranda rights. 30 Valdez accompanied
the police to the station, where they again issued Valdez the Miranda
warnings.' 3 1 Valdez denied any involvement in the murder. 3 2 Later that day,
Valdez confessed to the killing. 133 The authorities again read him his Miranda
warnings and arrested him. 34
On July 26, 1989, the Grady County Sheriffs Office contacted the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to assist in the investigation
because it involved a Mexican national. 35 By the INS agent's account, his
role was to ensure that the language barrier did not hinder the investigation
and any potential criminal prosecution. 36 However, neither the INS nor local
authorities notified Valdez of his Article 36 right to contact the Mexican
consulate. "'
A jury in the District Court of Grady County, Oklahoma, convicted Valdez
of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. 138 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the decision in March 1995, and the U.S. Supreme
Court denied Valdez' petition for certiorari. 39
' After the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals denied Valdez' original application for postconviction
relief, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied
Valdez' petition for habeas relief. 40 The Tenth Circuit affirmed in July
2000.'' Finally, on April 16, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Valdez'
final petition for a writ of certiorari. 142 On April 23, 2001, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals set Valdez' execution date for June 19, 200 1.
Throughout the appellate process, authorities failed to notify Valdez of his
right to contact the Mexican consulate and failed to notify the Mexican
government of Valdez' arrest, conviction, and sentence until April 19,2001.'44
Upon learning of Valdez' predicament, the Mexican government hired its own
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. 13, 900 P.2d at 370.
Id. 15, 900 P.2d at 370.
Id.
Id. 16, 900 P.2d at 370-7 1.
Id. 1 22, 900 P.2d at 370.
Id. 1 23, 900 P.2d at 372.
Id.
Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, 1 6, 46 P.3d 703, 705 (Valdez If).
Valdez L, 1,900 P.2d at 368.
Valdez v. Oklahoma, 516 U.S. 967 (1995); Valdez I, 1,900 P.2d at 368.
Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000).
Ward, 219 F.3d at 1245.
Valdez v. Gibson, 532 U.S. 979 (2001).
Valdez II, 2, 46 P.3d at 704.
Id. 6, 46 P.3d at 705.
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attorney, investigators, and neuropsychologists to investigate Valdez'
background and to mount a new defense. "'. On June 6, 2001, the state Pardon
and Parole Board heard new evidence gathered by the new defense team
concerning head injuries suffered by Valdez as a child and as an adult. One of
these injuries had "damaged his brain's left frontal lobe." 4 6 The Board voted
to commute the death sentence to life without parole, and Frank Keating,
Governor
of Oklahoma, granted a thirty-day stay of execution to consider the
47
matter. 1
Despite the Board's recommendation and Mexican President Vicente Fox's
request to reduce Valdez' sentence, Governor Keating denied clemency on
July 20, 2001, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals set the new
execution date for August 30, 2001.148 Before the scheduled execution,
however, Governor Keating again stayed the execution to allow Mexico time
to pursue other legal avenues. 14' Thereafter, Valdez filed a second application
for postconviction relief under Oklahoma's Uniform Post-Conviction Relief
Act (UPRA), 5 ° and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stayed the
execution pending the outcome of the proceedings.' 5
Under the Oklahoma UPRA, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals may
not consider the merits of a subsequent application for postconviction relief
until it makes a threshold determination as to whether title 22, section 1089
of the Oklahoma Statutes applies.5 2 Section 1089, Oklahoma's procedural
default rule, provides that a defendant's claims are procedurally defaulted
145. Raymond Bonner, Mexican Killer lsRefused Clemency by Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2001, at A8.
146. Bob Doucette, Board Votes to Commute Sentence, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 7, 2001,
at lA.
147. Valdez II, 2, 46 P.3d at 704; Doucette, supra note 146, at 1A.
148. Valdez II, 2, 46 P.3d at 704; Diane Plumberg Clay, Governor Opts Not to Block
Execution, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 21, 2001, at IA. Governor Keating acknowledged the
Article 36 violation but based his decision on his conclusion that the violation had no
prejudicial effect on the guilty verdict or sentence. Id.
149. Valdez II, 2,46 P.3d at 704; Brooke A. Masters, U.S. DeprivedMexican ofFairTrial,
Appeal Says; Death Row Inmate Wasn't Told He Could Enlist His Country'sAid; Okla. Case
Could Set Precedent,WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2001, at A8.
150. 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1080-1089 (2001).
151. Valdez II, 3,46 P.3d at 704-05. Valdez also filed a "Motion for Evidentiary Hearing
and Discovery, an Application for Special Admission of Non Resident Attorneys, and a Motion
for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief from the Government of Mexico." Id. 1 3, 46 P.3d at
705. The court directed the state to "file a Response to Petitioner's Second Application for
Post-Conviction Relief, granted the Motion of the Mexican Government to file an Amicus brief,
granted the Applications for Special Admission of Non Resident Attorneys.... and established
a briefing schedule." Id.
152. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(8) (2001).
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unless sufficient facts establish that the claims on appeal were not and "could
not have been presented" in prior proceedings because the claim's factual or
legal basis was unavailable.' 5 3 A legal basis was unavailable if (1) the
applicant could not have reasonably formulated the legal basis from a final
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, a U.S. court of appeals, or a state
appellate court, or (2) the legal basis is a new constitutional rule given
retroactive effect by the U.S. Supreme Court or a state appellate court.' 54 A
factual basis is unavailable if not ascertainable despite reasonable diligence. 55
'
Valdez' second application for postconviction relief constituted the first
time that he raised Oklahoma's failure to comply with Article 36, 56 thus
implicating section 1089.157 Against this statutory and procedural background,
Valdez framed his arguments and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
58
considered the matter.

B. Court'sAnalysis and Holdings
Valdez proposed four grounds for relief: that (1) LaGrand bound the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and required it to provide relief for
Oklahoma's violation of Article 36; (2) Valdez did not have to show
prejudice; (3) Oklahoma's admitted Article 36 violation entitled Valdez to
challenge his conviction and sentence; and, (4) Valdez was "entitled to a new
trial."' 59 These four propositions are combined into two issues below. The
Court rejected Valdez' Article 36 arguments but granted relief on other
grounds. This subpart focuses on the court's possibly misplaced reliance on
Breard v. Greene and discusses issues that should have been raised. With
such questions raised, Part VIII discusses possibilities for the future.
1. Whether the Oklahoma Court of CriminalAppeals Was Bound by
LaGrand
For LaGrand to apply to Valdez' plea for postconviction relief, he had to
persuade the court that the ICJ's holdings in LaGrand constituted binding
precedent on the United States. In support of this claim, Valdez made six
arguments: (1) that U.S. ratification of the Optional Protocol to the VCCR
and the U.N. Charter acknowledges compliance with ICJ decisions; (2) that
principles of stare decisis made the decision binding; (3) that principles of
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(8) (2001).
Id. § 1089(D)(9)(a)-(b).
Id. § 1089(D)(9).
See Valdez II, 1 10, 46 P.3d at 706.
Id. 5, 46 P.3d at 705.
Id. 111, 46 P.3d at 707.
Id. T 10, 46 P.3d at 706.
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issue preclusion made the decision binding; (4) that principles of pacta sunt
servanda made the decision binding; (5) that applying LaGrand to some
foreign nationals and not to others would violate the equal protection clause
of the U.S. Constitution; and (6) that refusing to apply LaGrand to Valdez
60
because Valdez is not German created a non-uniform result. 1
Upon this foundation, Valdez argued that, under the Supremacy Clause of
161
the U.S. Constitution and article I, section I of the Oklahoma Constitution,
U.S. treaties become Oklahoma law.'6 2 Thus, by equating the VCCR to
federal statutes, Valdez argued that the VCCR supersedes any Oklahoma law
with which it conflicts. 163 Furthermore, Valdez argued that, because the
United States is bound by LaGrand, the decision constitutes the "rule of
decision" for the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.1"4
Accordingly, Valdez asserted that LaGrand's holding prohibited Oklahoma
from applying its procedural default rule because such application prevented
him from challenging his conviction and sentence on the basis of Oklahoma's
admitted Article 36 violation. 165 Furthermore, Valdez argued that the ICJ's
holding simply restated Article 36(2) - that domestic laws must give full
effect to the purposes of Article 36.166
Anticipating opposition on the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Breard, Valdez contended that Breard failed to control for four primary
reasons. First, Valdez argued that the Court decided Breardin the context of
67
an ICJ provisional order which bore no relationship to the facts in Valdez. 1
Second, Valdez argued that Breard was both a per curiam opinion and a
decision denying certiorari, both of which decreased the decision's
precedential value. 168 Third, Valdez argued that Breard did not expressly
decide whether Article 36 confers individual rights, nor "whether state
procedural default rules may bar consideration of an Article 36 claim not
previously raised in the courts."' 169 Finally, Valdez argued that Breard

160. Id. 1 16, 46 P.3d at 707-08.
161. Article I, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "The State of Oklahoma
is an inseparable part of the Federal Union, and the Constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the land." OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.

162. Second Application for Post-Conviction Relief at 42, Valdez v. State of Oklahoma,
2002 OK CR 20, 46 P.3d 703 (No. PCD-2001-101 1) [hereinafter Second Application].
163. Id.
164. Id. at 42-43.
165. Id. at 56.
166. Id.
167. Id.at 43 n.23.
168. Id.
169. Id. (emphasis added).
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addressed the federal procedural default statute and the "later-in-time rule,"
a rule which applies only in the context of treaties and federal statutes.70
In response to Valdez' arguments, the State of Oklahoma contended that it
was not bound by LaGrand. This contention centered on two primary points:
the nature of the ICJ and U.S. federalism. First, the State argued that the ICJ's
nature rendered LaGrandnonbinding. Citing Article 59 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, the State asserted that the ICJ's rulings are
binding only between the parties to the specific case decided by the ICJ.' 7 '
Furthermore, the State argued that Mexico is not a party to the Optional
Protocol and, therefore, could not bring Valdez' case before the ICJ. 7 '
Second, the State specifically referred to Beard v. Greene in arguing that,
(1) regardless of whether the United States submitted to the ICJ's jurisdiction
in LaGrand,and (2) regardless of the fact that the ICJ's ruling prohibited use
of the procedural default rule in some cases, under American federalism, the
court must follow "clear decisions of the United States Supreme Court on
federal questions." '73 The State acknowledged that treaties constitute the
supreme law of the land but countered that the "the Supremacy clause does
not convert violations of treaty provisions into violations of constitutional
rights."'

17 4

In addition, the State argued that the ICJ is a "non-Article II court" and
cited Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaraguav. Reagan 7 5 for the
proposition that although the United States may violate international law by
contravening an ICJ decision, such a violation does not give standing to a
private individual as a basis for relief.'76 Accordingly, the State argued that
Breardcontrolled the issue and allowed use of the procedural default rule in
the context of Article 36 violations.
Upon weighing these arguments, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
held that it is not bound by LaGrand'77 The court seemingly grounded this
decision in the federalist nature of the U.S. governmental system. The court
stated that "[f]or this Court to decide the ICJ's ruling overrules a binding
decision of the United States Supreme Court and affords a judicial remedy to

170. Id.
171. Response to Second Application for Post-Conviction Relief at 35, Valdez v. State, 2002
OK CR 20,46 P.3d 703 (No. PCD-2001-101 1) [hereinafter Response to Second Application].
172. Id. at 36.
173. Id. at 33-34.
174. Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, 1 18, 46 P.3d 703, 708 (Valdez II).
175. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
176. Response to Second Application, supra note 171, at 35 (quoting U.S. Citizens Living
in Nicaragua,859 F.2d at 934).
177. Valdez 11, 1 22, 46 P.3d at 709.
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an individual for a violation of the Convention would interfere with the
nation's foreign affairs and run afoul of the U.S. Constitution." '
Accordingly, the court applied Oklahoma's procedural default rule,
concluding that "until such time as the supreme arbiter of the law of the
United States changes its ruling, its decision in Breardcontrols this issue."' 79
2. Whether LaGrand CreatedNew Law Under Oklahoma's Procedural
DefaultRule
As an alternative to his main argument, Valdez argued that, even if
Oklahoma applied its procedural default statute, his claim arose under "a new
legal basis" as defined by title 22, section 1089 of the Oklahoma Statutes.' 80
Valdez based this assertion on his assumption that LaGrandbound the court
and created a legal basis for his claim that "could not have been reasonably
formulated" in his original application for postconviction relief.''
Specifically, Valdez contended that two of the ICJ's holdings formed a new
legal basis because (1) Article 36 creates individual rights, and (2) procedural
default rules may not be applied when they prevent accused from challenging
their convictions or sentences on the basis of an Article 36 violation.' 82
As to his first assertion, Valdez argued that he could not have previously
asserted his individual rights under Article 36 because no court "ha[d] ever
authoritatively interpreted Article 36 as giving rise to an individually
enforceable right," and that reasonable diligence could not have uncovered
such authority. 83 As to his second assertion, Valdez contended that the ICJ's
prohibition of the procedural default rule's application was the first of its
kind. 84
The State countered Valdez' arguments by contending that Valdez could
have reasonably formulated them prior to his first application for
postconviction relief.'85 First, the State asserted that several courts previously
had addressed the issue of whether Article 36 conferred individual rights prior
to Valdez' first application for postconviction relief. 186 Second, the State
argued that the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. courts of appeals had issued

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. 23, 46 P.3d at 709.
Id. 22, 46 P.3d at 709.
Id. 1 10 n.17, 46 P.3d at 706 n.17.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(8)-(9) (2001).
Second Application, supra note 162, at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
Valdez II, 21, 46 P.3d at 709.
Response to Second Application, supra note 171, at 21; Valdez II, 1 21,46 P.3d at 709.
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many decisions concerning the status of treaty law as the supreme law of the
land under the Supremacy Clause.'8 7
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that LaGrand failed to
create a new legal basis for Article 36 claims and also failed to create a new
rule of constitutional law for two reasons. First, with regard to Valdez'
asserted individual rights, the court held that Valdez could have raised the
Article 36 violation in prior proceedings and even prior to LaGrand.'88 In so
doing, the court cited Oklahoma cases in which Article 36 violations had been
raised. 89 The court reasoned that, while the ICJ decision arguably created
individual rights under the VCCR and barred the application of the procedural
default statute, the individual-rights issue had been addressed for many years
by numerous courts across the nation. 9 ° Second, with regard to the ICJ's
prohibition of the procedural default rule's application in certain
circumstances, the court reiterated that Breard v. Greene controlled the
statutes to play a role
procedural default issue and allowed procedural default
191
in the regulation of laws governing Article 36 rights.
C. Oklahoma Court of CriminalAppeals' FinalDecision
Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for
resentencing by citing "its power to grant relief' when a miscarriage ofjustice
occurs.' 9 2 Despite denying Valdez relief on the basis of his international law
arguments, the court found an exception to the procedural default rule "on the
ground that it would appear no factual basis of the Petitioner's prior medical
problems was ascertained by prior trial or appellate counsel before the filing
of Petitioner's prior appeals." ' Applying this exception, the court reviewed
Valdez' application.
Despite having considered the claim in prior appeals, the court attributed
the failure to discover the prior medical evidence to ineffective assistance of
counsel.'9' The court justified its review of trial counsel's performance on the
grounds that it had not been specifically presented with claims that trial
counsel missed pertinent evidence concerning Valdez' social, mental, and
health background and had failed to inform Petitioner that he could receive
187. Response to Second Application, supra note 171, at 22.
188. Valdez 11, 21,46 P.3d at 709.
189. These cases were Flores v. State, 1999 OK CR 52, 994 P.2d 782, Martinez v. State,
1999 OK CR 33, 984 P.2d 813, and AI-Mosawi v. State, 1998 OK CR 18, 956 P.2d 906.
190. Id. 22, 46 P.3d at 709.
191. Id.
192. Id. 28, 46 P.3d at 711.
193. Id. 24, 46 P.3d at 710.
194. Id. 27, 46 P.3d at 710.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/23

2003]

COMMENT

assistance from his consulate. 95 The court stated that it "cannot have
confidence in the jury's sentencing determination and affirm its assessment
of a death sentence where the jury was not presented with very significant and
important evidence bearing upon Petitioner's mental status and psyche at the
time of the crime."'' 96 In its final analysis, the court granted relief on the basis
of its power to remedy a miscarriage of justice.' 97 Such reasoning prompted
Presiding Judge Gary L. Lumpkin's dissent. Judge Lumpkin agreed that
Valdez' Article 36 claim was previously available but dissented as to the
majority's review of trial counsel's performance on grounds that it had already
been raised and rejected. 9 Judge Lumpkin viewed the majority's decision as
disregarding the rule of law, affirming that "[t]his Court should not make
political decisions; it should bind itself to applying the law."' 99
VII. Analysis of Valdez
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals became one of the first state
courts to address Article 36 of the VCCR after LaGrand. Valdez, therefore,
serves as an initial answer to the question of how the United States and
individual states will deal with Article 36 post-LaGrand.Furthermore, Valdez
adds to the overarching question of how international law, and, in this case,
how decisions of international courts, affect the U.S. judicial system. Noting
the importance of Valdez before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
actually rendered the decision, one author commented that "the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals clearly has signaled the seriousness of the VCCR
issue and the significance of LaGrandas an important new factor in the legal
landscape.
The significance of a state court deciding Valdez cannot be overstated.
Logically speaking, foreign nationals will most often receive notice of their
Article 36 rights through local and state authorities. Likewise, foreign
nationals will most likely raise Article 36 claims in state courts, especially in
LaGrand's aftermath. Therefore, states may play the most vital role in
determining Article 36's impact and the ICJ's interpretation of its provisions.
Moreover, states may be best suited to deal with these issues. For example,
a state legislature might incorporate ICJ determinations into state law.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. 28, 46 P.3d at 710.
198. Id. 9H 1-2, 46 P.3d at 711 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
199. Id. 7, 46 P.3d at 712 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
200. Howard S. Schiffman, The LaGrandDecision: The Evolving Legal Landscape of the
Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations in the U.S. Death Penalty Cases,42 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1099, 1121 (2002).
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Furthermore, a state court might incorporate Article 36 rights into the state
constitution's due process clause. This line of reasoning might provide a
better framework for analyzing the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36 than
attempting to determine whether ICJ rulings bind state courts. More
importantly, such reasoning emphasizes state sovereignty in determining how
to adjust to the impact of international law. In sum, this Comment contends
that, while states must not disregard U.S. international obligations and
authoritative decisions of the ICJ, states must begin their analysis by
determining what the U.S. system allows and proceed from there.
A. Whether LaGrandIs Binding on State Courts May Not Be the Issue
The United States is indisputably bound by LaGrandfor two reasons. First,
as a party to the Charter of the United Nations, the United States agreed to
comply with ICJ decisions in any case to which it is a party.2"' In fact, U.S.
failure to comply with LaGrandwould grant Germany the right to request that
the U.N. Security Council give the judgment effect."' Second, as part of the
VCCR, the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes makes clear that the ICJ has compulsory jurisdiction over disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the VCCR. °3 However, the
binding nature of ICJ decisions is limited. Article 59 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice affirms that ICJ decisions can only bind parties
respecting their particular case.2 4 Applying Article 59 to LaGrandwould
mean that lCJ rulings apply only in the application of Article 36 to specific,
decided cases involving the United States and Germany. Therefore, arguing
that LaGrand binds state courts is difficult at best. State courts'
understandable aversion to holding that ICJ rulings are binding further
increases this difficulty.
Additionally, Article 1I1 of the U.S. Constitution may affect whether ICJ
decisions bind U.S. courts in cases other than those pending before the ICJ.
Article III relates that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
2 5 Thus, on its face, Article 1H1 clearly
from time to time ordain and establish.""
grants the power to affect the United States judicially to only one U.S. court.
201. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
202. Id. para. 2.
203. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S.
487, 488.
204. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59,59 Stat. 1031, 1055,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179.
205. U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 1.
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This limitation raises major concerns as to whether the Constitution even
allows the United States to submit to the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal if the effect will be such that the tribunal's decisions overrule the U.S.
Supreme Court.2"
As such, Valdez may have been more successful contending for the
reception of LaGrand in Oklahoma through such avenues as judicial
deference to the ICJ or incorporation into the Oklahoma Constitution.
However, the argument may have proven fruitless because of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals' reliance on Breard for application of the
Oklahoma procedural default statute. This reliance, of course, precluded the
court's consideration of these issues.
B. Does BreardPreclude a State's Considerationof Article 36 and
LaGrand?
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals framed the issue in Valdez as
whether to follow the ICJ or the U.S. Supreme Court. Expressing fear that the
former path would interfere with U.S. foreign affairs and violate the U.S.
Constitution, the court ultimately concluded that Breard tied its hands and
chose the latter path.2 7 However, whether Breard has such an effect is
debatable. First, Breard's procedural stance and application of federal law
call into question its applicability to a state case such as Valdez. Second, the
more general issues of federalism and state sovereignty raise further questions
that state courts should address when considering ICJ rulings.
1. Specific Characteristicsof Breard as Applied to Valdez
Breard'sapplicability to Valdez is questionable for five reasons. First, the
Supreme Court's procedural stance at the time it issued the opinion raises
problems. Second, the Supreme Court applied federal habeas corpus law in
Breard, whereas the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals applied
Oklahoma's broader postconviction relief statute. Third, the Supreme Court
failed to determine in accordance with Article 36(2) whether the federal
procedural default statute gives full effect to Article 36 rights. Fourth, the
Supreme Court failed to state definitively whether Article 36 confers
individual rights. Finally, the Supreme Court applied the "later-in-time" rule
in Breardto the federal procedural default statute, which has no application
to Oklahoma's state procedural default statute. Each of these issues are
addressed below.
206. Mark Weisburd, InternationalCourtsandAmerican Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877,
891-900 (2000).
207. Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, 1 22, 46 P.3d 703, 706 (Valdez II).
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On the issue of procedural stance, Breard v. Greene is a per curiam
decision2 °8 decided on an accelerated timetable because of the Commonwealth
of Virginia's decision to set Breard's execution date for the same date that it
issued the opinion.2 °9 Justice Souter dissented on these very grounds, stating
that "the international aspects of this case provide an additional reason for
adhering to our established Rules and procedures.... I respectfully dissent
from the decision to act hastily rather than with the deliberation that is
appropriate in a case of this character., 211 Justice Breyer's dissent echoed this
same sentiment: "Virginia is now pursuing an execution schedule that leaves
less time for argument and for Court consideration than the Court's Rules
provide for ordinary cases. "211

Furthermore, because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Breard, the
decision carries less weight then it would have if the Supreme Court had
actually heard the case. In Teague v. Lane,2 12 the Supreme Court ruled that
petitioners cannot "benefit from the rule announced" in a case denying
certiorari.2" 3 Citing other Supreme Court case law, the Teague Court also
clarified that denials of certiorari do not adjudicate the merits of the case214
and do not carry precedential value.2 15
Second, the Supreme Court applied the federal procedural default statute,
which differs significantly from the Oklahoma statute. As explained above,
the Oklahoma statute provides two avenues whereby an applicant may
establish a legal basis that was unavailable prior to the original postconviction
relief application.21 6 However, the federal statute provides only one avenue
for establishing a new legal basis - the applicant must show that the claim
relies upon "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
2'17
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.,
Therefore, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' strict reliance on Breard
is questionable because the Supreme Court had no opportunity to consider
whether LaGrandcreated a new legal basis other than new constitutional law.

208.
209.
Relief.
210.
211.
212.
213.
Relief.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372 (1998).
Id. at 379; Valdez argued these points in his Second Application for Post-Conviction
Second Application, supra note 162, at 43 n.23.
Greene, 523 U.S. at 380.
Id. at 381.
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 296. Valdez made this argument in his Second Application for Post-Conviction
Second Application, supra note 162, at 43 n.23.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 296 (citing United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)).
Id. (citing Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950)).
See supra Part II.D.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (2000).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/23

COMMENT

2003]

A third reason that Breard may be inapplicable arises from the Supreme
Court's questionable interpretation of Article 36. The Supreme Court held
that, as a general principle of international law, the forum state's procedural
rules govern the treaty's implementation in that respective state. 218 For
support, the Court cited Article 36(2), which provides that the right to
consular access and notification "shall be exercised in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State" provided that those laws give "full
effect.., to the purposes for which the rights accorded.., are intended." 219
However, the Supreme Court failed to determine whether the federal
procedural default statute, in fact, gives full effect to Article 36. Such a
determination is critical in determining compliance not only with LaGrand,
but also with the treaty itself.
In addition, the Supreme Court failed to state definitively whether Article
36 confers individual rights, holding only that Article 36 "arguably confers on
an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest. "22' The ICJ, on
the other hand, clearly found that Article 36 actually confers individual rights.
The issue is critical for two reasons. First, if a detained foreign national has
an individual right to consular notification and assistance, the right is
judicially enforceable. Second, the ICJ's ruling constituted the first
authoritative ruling on the matter and answers a question long disputed in the
United States.
Finally, the Supreme Court applied the "later-in-time" rule to Article 36,
holding that the AEDPA controls because Congress enacted it after the
VCCR. 22 1 The later-in-time rule hinges on the principle that treaty law
equates with a U.S. federal statute. Therefore, the "later-in-time" rule fails to
apply to Oklahoma's state procedural default statute. In fact, according to the
later-in-time rule, Article 36 trumps any conflicting state statutes.
Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relied on Breardfor
the general principles that U.S. law, whether state or federal, governs the
implementation of any rights conferred by Article 36 and that governing
legislation may include the procedural default statutes.222 However, it seems
that Breard does not enjoy a solid foundation, especially in state court after
the LaGrand decision.

218.
219.
294.
220.
221.
222.

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292,
Id. at 376.
Id.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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2. Questions of Federalism: Does the FederalistNature of the U.S.
Legal System Actually Require Adherence to Breard and Preclude
Application of LaGrandin State Courts?
Rather than determining whether Breard bound the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals in its consideration of the application of LaGrand,it might
be better to consider whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would
violate U.S. Supreme Court precedent if it chooses to accept Valdez-type
arguments in the future and apply LaGrand. Likewise, it might be useful to
consider whether any federal precedent would prevent an Oklahoma trial
court, faced with an Article 36 claim today, from deferring to the ICJ's
interpretation. These issues require analysis focusing on the structure of the
U.S. legal system rather than on international perception of whether the ICJ
decision controls.
The Supreme Court and federal government have provided some evidence
that state courts possess the authority to determine the level of deference that
they give to the ICJ. Just before the Breard decision, Paraguay sought a
provisional order from the ICJ to stay Breard's execution until the ICJ
determined whether his Article 36 rights had been violated.22 3 The ICJ issued
the order requiring the United States to take all available measures to stay the
execution until the ICJ had considered the matter.224 However, the Supreme
Court deferred to the Governor of Virginia, maintaining that it lacked the
power to stay Breard's execution. The Court stated that "[i]f the Governor
wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing
'
in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for him."225
Granted,
an ICJ provisional order was not considered definitively binding at the time
of the Brearddecision.226 However, briefs filed by the State Department and
Justice Department argued that, even if the ICJ order were binding, the U.S.
Supreme Court lacked the authority to compel Virginia to comply with the
order and stay the execution."' More recently, in February 2003, the ICJ
considered issuing a provisional order to stay the U.S. executions of three
Mexican nationals in Mexico v. United States of America.228 Opposing the
223. Id. at 374.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 378.
226. Id. at 374, 378; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. TI 98, 110 (June 27), at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm
(making clear that LaGrand
constitutes the first time that the ICJ has expressly ruled on the binding nature of provisional

orders).
227. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 562 (1999).
228. Case Concerning the Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J.
128 (Feb. 5). As of February 5, 2003, the Mexican nationals were awaiting capital punishment
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order's issuance, the United States argued that a provisional order "would
drastically interfere with United States sovereign rights and implicate
'
Furthermore, U.S. attorney Elihu
important federalism interests."229
in
Lauterpacht was recently paraphrased as stating that "staying executions
2 30
government.
federal
U.S.
the
for
state prisons might be unenforceable
These statements indicate the federal government's concern not only for
international obligations, but also for ensuring that international law comports
with domestic law in a manner that does not violate the U.S. Constitution or
U.S. federalism. While the two situations described in Breard and Mexico
entail federal enforcement of ICJ decisions at the state level, both also indicate
that state sovereignty allows for the reception of ICJ decisions without federal
interference. This indicates that Breard should not have prevented the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals from considering the applicability of
LaGrand in Oklahoma.
C. The Court Ultimately Granted Valdez Review on a FactualBasis - But
the Reasoning Is Faulty
While this comment focuses on the international law issues present in
Valdez, it is worth noting how the court ultimately granted review of Valdez'
case and the problems with its reasoning. Title 22, section 1089 of the
Oklahoma Statutes allows courts to grant relief if a legal or factual basis were
previously unavailable.23' While the court chose not to recognize LaGrandas
creating a new legal basis, the court granted review under section 1089 on
grounds that Valdez presented a new factual basis.
The statute provides that a factual basis is unavailable if it "was not
'
However,
ascertainablethrough the exercise of reasonable diligence." 232
that
its
conclusion
on
emphasis
despite this language, the Valdez court placed
23
3
Valdez' prior medical problems were not ascertainedby prior counsel. The
court apparently stretched the language of section 1089 because the test
focuses not on whether certain facts were actually discovered, but whether
they were discoverable through reasonable diligence. The court briefly
addressed this concern and attempted to resolve it on the basis that Valdez'
trial counsel lacked sufficient funds to properly investigate Valdez' past and
that counsel believed no additional funds were available due to his
in Texas and Oklahoma. Toby Sterling, World Court Orders U.S. to Stay Executions of 3
Mexicans, AP ONuINE, Feb. 5, 2003.
229. Mexico v. United States, 2003 I.C.J. 128, 147.
230. Sterling, supra note 228, at A3.

231. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(8)-(9) (2001).
232. Id. § 1089(D)(9) (emphasis added).
233. Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20,124, 46 P.3d 703, 710 (Valdez II).
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inexperience.234 Therefore, the court found an exception to section 1089 when
inexperienced and ineffective trial counsel fails to discover a factual basis
which prejudices the accused.235
Ultimately, the court granted relief on the combined grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel and the resulting miscarriage of justice.23 6 It should be
noted that Valdez had raised an ineffective assistance of counsel defense on
prior appeals as well.237 The court distinguished this prior claim of ineffective
assistance by reasoning that it had not been specifically presented with the
claim that trial counsel failed to present evidence of Valdez' background.238
In the final analysis, the court decided the case based on a questionable
reading of section 1089 and then granted relief on an already adjudicated
claim based on the court's subjective power to rule that a "miscarriage of
justice" had occurred.239
VIII. Possible FutureAlternatives
Assuming that Brearddoes not preclude reliance on LaGrand, Oklahoma
has great discretion in determining whether and how to apply the ICJ ruling.
Several possibilities exist, and none requires consideration of whether
LaGrandis binding. Thus, states can incorporate LaGrand into their legal
structure as part of their respective state law rather than international law.
A. The PoliticalQuestion Doctrine
Considering possibilities for the incorporation of LaGrand requires an
understanding that courts could follow the Valdez decision and decline to give
effect to LaGrand. However, courts might be better served to reject LaGrand
on such grounds as the political-question doctrine rather than reliance on
Breard. The political-question doctrine asserts that the U.S. Constitution's
structure combined with practical considerations prevent the courts from
deciding certain issues, especially those that involve international relations.24 °
In addition, the doctrine embodies the principle that the legislative and
executive branches are better equipped to determine foreign policy.24 ' The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals briefly reached this issue, expressing its
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. 1 25, 46
Id. 26, 46
Id. 1 28, 46
Id. 27,46
Id.
Id. 28, 46

P.3d at
P.3d at
P.3d at
P.3d at

710.
710.
710.
710.

P.3d at 710.

240. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalismof FreeNations, in INTERNATIONALLAWDECISIONS

INNATIONAL COURTS 14-15 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
241. Id. at 14.
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concern that adherence to LaGrand would disrupt U.S. foreign affairs and
violate the U.S. Constitution.24 2 However, such a ruling may unnecessarily
defer to Congress and the President. The Oklahoma legislature might be able
to take more direct action.243
B. Legislative Action
Enacting legislation that gives effect to Article 36 rights may be the most
sensible step towards remedying the persistent interpretative problems
plaguing the provision. 2" Such legislation could require law enforcement
officials to notify foreign detainees of their right to contact their respective
consulates. Some states, such as California,2 45 have already adopted such
measures, 246 which require law enforcement officials to inform foreign
nationals of their right to contact their consulate within two hours of being
arrested, booked, or detained.
Florida also has enacted legislation giving some effect to Article 36.
Florida Statute Chapter 288.816 requires the Secretary of State to formulate
rules that "[e]stablish a system of communication to provide all state and local
law enforcement agencies with information regarding proper procedures
relating to the arrest or incarceration of a foreign citizen. 247 Such legislation
could constitute one step toward including Article 36 rights within the
Miranda rights.248 While legislative action appears to be a simple solution, it
creates further constitutional concerns. The major concern is whether the
inclusion of Article 36 rights within the Miranda warnings means that an
Article 36 violation equates to a constitutional violation requiring dismissal
of an indictment or evidence suppression.

242. Valdez II, 23, 46 P.3d at 709.
243. See infra Part VI]I.B-D.
244. See supra Part VII.B.2 for a discussion of problems arising from interpretation of
Article 36.
245. Schiffman, supra note 200, at 1130.
246. California enacted a statute requiring
every peace officer, upon arrest and booking or detention for more than two hours
of a known or suspected foreign national, shall advise the foreign national that he
or she has a right to communicate with an official from the consulate of his or her
country.... If the foreign national chooses to exercise that right, the peace officer
shall notify the pertinent official in his or her agency or department of the arrest
or detention and that the foreign national wants his or her consulate notified.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(1) (2000).
247. FLA. STAT. ch. 288.816(2)(f) (2001).
248. Schiffman, supra note 200, at 1130.
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C. JudicialAction - Deference to the ICJ and Incorporationof LaGrand
into the Oklahoma Constitution
Even if LaGrand is not binding on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals as a matter of law and Brearddoes not preclude reliance on LaGrand,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals could still effectuate the ICJ's
rulings through judicial deference to the ICJ or by incorporating LaGrandinto
the Oklahoma Constitution. Simple deference to the ICJ on interpretation of
international treaties offers several advantages, including assistance in
ensuring justice, uniformity, and correct interpretation of international law.249
Furthermore, state courts should understand that the ICJ typically renders
conservative decisions.5 0 Such understanding could alleviate the inherent
concerns over deferring to an international tribunal.
Another possibility arises from the judicial incorporation of LaGrandinto
the Oklahoma Constitution. Clearly, federal courts have resisted granting
Article 36 rights the same level of constitutional import as Miranda rights
receive under the U.S. Constitution.25 ' However, this does not prevent
Oklahoma from giving such effect to Article 36 under its state constitution.
Article II, section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution states that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."25
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has specifically linked Article 36
rights to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' minimum
due process guarantees.253 Likewise, incorporation of treaty principles is not
unthinkable at the state or federal level, especially when they involve human
rights norms.254 Thus, incorporation of Article 36 into the due process clause
of the Oklahoma Constitution might be an option. Advantages would include

249. Sarita Ordonez & David Reilly, Effect of the Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCourt
of Justice on NationalCourts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS INNATIONAL COURTS, supra
note 240, at 370.
250. Id.
[I]t should be emphasized that the I.C.J. is a conservative body and often shies
away from progressive interpretations of controversial doctrines. Judicial restraint
has always been a hallmark of the Court as evidenced by the fact that the Court
applies well-established principles of international law and does not invent its own
law.
Id. (citations omitted).
251. Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cit. 1997).
252. OKLA. CONST. art. H, § 7.
253. See supra Part V.A.
254. See generally Catherine Powell, DialogicFederalism: ConstitutionalPossibilitiesfor
Incorporationof Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001).
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the expansion of due process in Oklahoma and the recognition of the United
States' international obligations at the state level.
Section 1089 may provide an avenue for such incorporation. As explained
above, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals may consider an application
for postconviction relief if the petitioner argues a previously unavailable legal
basis. 2" The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found, in essence, that
LaGrand failed to affect the availability of Valdez' claim that Article 36
creates individual rights because the same assertion had been raised in
Oklahoma and in courts across the country. However, the court appeared to
discount LaGrand'simpact. Before LaGrand,no clear authority existed to
reinforce the notion that Article 36 creates individual rights. Considering the
authoritative nature of the ICJ's interpretation, LaGrand possibly created a
new legal basis, and the Valdez court could have incorporated it as a new rule
of constitutional law. More importantly, no court had held that procedural
default rules may not be applied if they prevent petitioners from challenging
their convictions and sentences. The ICJ clearly established that in cases such
as LaGrand,especially those cases involving the death penalty, courts may not
apply procedural default rules.2" 6 Certainly, this ruling constituted a new legal
basis because no U.S. courts have held similarly. Regrettably, reliance on
Breardprecluded the court from further consideration of this matter when, in
fact, closer consideration of Article 36(2) should have prompted the court to
consider whether Oklahoma's procedural default statute fully effectuates the
purposes of Article 36.
D. Compliance Through Clemency Proceedings
In LaGrand,the ICJ stated that violation of Article 36 rights in the United
States warrants "review and reconsideration" in light of Article 36
reconsiderations.25 7 The court failed to precisely define "review and
reconsideration," and this omission seems purposeful. In fact, the ICJ asserted
that review and reconsideration can be accomplished in various forms and that
the United States must be given the option to choose what form it will take.2" 8
Clemency proceedings might provide sufficient review and reconsideration 59
In Valdez' case, the state Pardon and Parole Board certainly considered the
effect ofthe VCCR violations when it heard evidence from Valdez' newly hired
team of lawyers and physicians. In fact, the Board voted to commute Valdez'
255. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(9)(a)-(b) (2001).
256. See infra Part V.B.2.
257. LaGrand Case, (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J.

1 125 (June 27), at http://www.icj-

cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus.igusframe.htm.
258. Id.
259. Schiffman,supra note 200, at 1131.
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death sentence. 2" Furthermore, although Governor Keating ultimately denied
the clemency, his letter to Mexican President Vicente Fox reflected the ICJ's
requirement. The governor wrote that "I am satisfied that an appropriate review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Valdez have
occurred."26
"' Likewise, Executive Order 2001-24 denying clemency stated the
governor had "thoroughly reviewed and reconsidered the arguments and
'
evidence presented in this case."262
More recently, the United States argued before the ICJ in Mexico v. United
States of America that the United States believes that clemency proceedings
provide sufficient review and reconsideration of Article 36 claims to comply
with LaGrand: "We... have made a conscious choice to focus our efforts on
clemency proceedings for providing the review and reconsideration [the ICJ]
called for in LaGrand.' 263 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals failed
to consider this possibility, which might have allowed the court to give some
effect to the ICJ judgment while maintaining complete compliance with state
law and preserving a sense of state sovereignty. Again, its overreliance on
Breardseems to have precluded such consideration.
IX. Policy Implications- Reciprocity
Traditionally, treaty enforcement has been based upon the rule of
reciprocity. In other words, States comply with treaties to ensure other States'
compliance with treaties. This principle has served as the basis for many
arguments that the United States' failure to enforce Article 36 may work to the
detriment of American citizens abroad.2 4 Indeed, at least one judge on the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed such. concern. In his
concurring opinion in Flores,Judge Chapel stated,
In my judgment, the decision of this Court in this case, and the
decision of the United States Supreme Court [referring to Breard]
puts U.S. citizens traveling abroad at risk of being detained without
notice to U.S. consular officials. Why should Mexico, or any other

260. Doucette, supra note 146, at 1A.
261. Letter from Frank Keating, Governor of Oklahoma, to President Vicente Fox Quesada,
President of Mexico 1 (July 20, 2001) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
262. Okla. Exec. Order No. 2001-24 (July 20,2001) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
263. Case Concerning the Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J.
128, 1 37 (Feb. 5).
264. See Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
147, 184 (1999); Schiffman, supra note 200, at 1129; Rebecca E. Woodman, International
Miranda? Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, 70 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 41,
42 (2001).
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signatory country, honor the Treaty if the U.S. will not enforce it?
The next time we see a 60 Minutes piece on a U.S. citizen locked
up in a Mexican jail without notice to any U.S. governmental
official we ought to remember these cases.265
Federal judges have expressed the same concern. In Breard v. Pruett, in
which the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Breard's writ of habeas
corpus, Judge Butzner stated in his concurring opinion that
[t]he protections afforded by the Vienna Convention go far beyond
Breard's case. United States citizens are scattered about the
world .... Their freedom and safety are seriously endangered if
state officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and other
nations follow their example. Public officials should bear in mind
that "international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity .. .. ,6
Finally, in 1979, the United States argued before the ICJ that Article 36
creates individual rights in United States v. Iran,967 the case involving the
Iranian hostage crisis. The Inter-American Court of Justice noted this fact in
its Advisory Opinion, stating that "the United States linked Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations with the rights of the nationals of
the sending State. 268
This evidence of U.S. concern for Americans traveling abroad signals the
need to give further effect to Article 36 at the state and federal levels, whether
or not LaGrand is considered binding. Not only is the safety of American
citizens a concern, but also the United States, as a nation that prides itself as
an adherer to the rule of law, cannot afford to enter into binding treaties and
then fail to enforce them effectively.
X. Recent Developments: The VCCR and the State of Illinois
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided Valdez in May 2002. In
September 2002, an Illinois federal court considered LaGrand's impact after the
Illinois Supreme Court denied relief to a Polish national who claimed violation
of his Article 36 rights. The Illinois Supreme Court denied relief on procedural
265. Flores v. State, 1999 OK CR 52, 1 4, 994 P.2d 782, 788 (Chapel, J., concurring).
266. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615,622 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 228 (1895)).
267. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
268. Advisory Opinion OC- 16/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 487, OEA/ser. L./V/III.47, doc. 6, 1 75
(2000).
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grounds. The developments in this case are provided as a contrast to the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Valdez.
A. Madej I: State Proceedings- Illinois' ProceduralDefault Rule
Precludes Considerationof Madej's Article 36 Rights
In 1982, an Illinois trial court convicted and sentenced Gregory Madej, a
Polish national, to death for murder and other crimes.269 In 1998, Madej sought
relief by filing a petition with the trial court under the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure, which allows a petitioner to seek relief if he files a petition no more
than two years after the judgment.270 The trial court denied relief, and Madej
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court in 2000, approximately one year prior to
LaGrand.27 1 Obviously, the time limitation barred Madej's petition because he
filed for relief approximately fourteen years too late.272 However, Madej argued
in part that the state failed to notify him of his Article 36 rights and that
273
"reliance on a state procedural rule to bar an action violates international law."
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. Regarding Article 36(2), the court
held that, "[b]ecause the treaty specifically states that the forum court's rules and
regulations will govern, we have no basis to conclude that the reasonable
limitation period violates international law., 274 Furthermore, the court stated
that Madej had not shown how Illinois law fails to give full effect to Article
36.275 Ultimately, the court affirmed Madej's conviction and death sentence.276
B. FederalCourt Proceedings
Madej then filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.277 Madej made the
same claims, but the federal court also denied him relief. The Northern District
of Illinois held that "this court again finds that Madej's Vienna Convention
claim is procedurally defaulted because the state court clearly relied on a state
procedural bar as an independent basis for its denial of relief.' 278 Ultimately, the
court granted Madej's petition concerning his death sentence and ordered

269. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 425 (Ill. 2000).
270. Id. at 426.
271. Id. at425.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 426.
274. Id. at 428.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 429.
277. United States ex rel. Madej v. Gilmore, No. 98-C-1866, 2002 WL 370222, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 8, 2002).
278. Id. at *10.
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resentencing, but did so based on his Sixth Amendment - not Article 36 rights.279

Madej next filed with the same court a motion to alter or amend the
judgment.28 ° Madej sought in part a new trial and sentencing hearing on the
basis of the state's Article 36 violations. Madej brought the LaGranddecision
to the court's attention and requested it to amend its judgment based on this ICJ
decision.28' In response, the court rendered three important holdings. First, the
court held that LaGrand"conclusively determines that Article 36 ... creates
individually enforceable rights, resolving the question most American courts
(including the Seventh Circuit) have left open. '282 Second, the court held that
LaGrandprohibits strict reliance on procedural default rules for Article 36
violations.283 Responding to the State of Illinois' argument that Breardcontrols
the issue, the court stated that "Breard does not withstand close scrutiny."284
The court reasoned that LaGrandundermined a major premise of Breard- that
procedural default rules give full effect to the purposes of Article 36.285 The
court reasoned that "[t]he I.C.J. has now declared that those rules do interfere
'
with giving full effect to the purposes of the treaty."286
The court also noted that
Breard "was decided on an accelerated timetable without full briefing and
consideration" and that it was a per curiam decision, thus concluding that Breard
' 287
is entitled to less "precedential authority.
Despite the court's criticism of Breard,the court based its third holding on
what seemed to be an afterthought in Breard. The Supreme Court stated in
Breardthat "[e]ven were Breard' s Vienna Convention claim properly raised and
proved, it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the
overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the
violation had an effect on the trial." 28 The federal court viewed this statement
in Breardas a blueprint for analyzing Article 36 violations.289 On this basis, the
court held that to gain relief for a VCCR violation, petitioners must show (1)
that their VCCR rights were violated; and (2) that the violation materially
affected the outcome of their trial or sentencing proceeding. 29 Applying this
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at *38.
United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
Id. at 978.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 978-79.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998).
Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
Id. at 980.
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test to Madej, the court found that violation of Madej's Article 36 rights failed
to affect his trial's outcome, but may have affected the outcome of his
" ' However, because the court had already granted relief
sentencing proceeding.29
on that basis in the prior proceeding, it considered the issue moot.292 Ultimately,
the judgment based on the
the court granted Madej's motion to alter or amend 293
Vienna Convention and LaGrandbut denied relief.

The federal court's decision indicates much deference to the ICJ based on
LaGrand. However, an important footnote at the end of the opinion creates
further difficulty. The footnote states,
If the Court did not deem the issue moot, the inquiry would not
necessarily end with granting Petitioner relief. Because the issue
presents itself on habeas corpus, the Court would have to grapple
with the threshold question of retroactivity. Since there is no clear
Supreme Court precedent about remedies for Vienna Convention
violations, it is unlikely that this, or any other Court could premise
relief on this basis.294
The court received another chance to address the issue when the State of
illinois filed a second motion to reconsider and asked the court to disregard the
ICJ. 295 The court reiterated its holdings, stating that the ICJ's interpretation
bound the United States and the court itself because the United States had
ratified the Optional Protocol.29 6 The court further declared that "no court can
credibly hold that the Vienna Convention does not create individually
enforceable rights.,, 29 7 Regarding whether relief might have been granted on the
Vienna Convention claim alone, the court stated that "it is extremely doubtful
at this point that a federal habeas court could premise relief on a Vienna
Convention violation," citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as limiting habeas corpus relief
to federal law violations of federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme
29 8

Court.

C. Implicationsfor the Oklahoma Court of CriminalAppeals
Madej highlights two major problems with Valdez. First, reliance on Breard
for the conclusion that procedural default rules are valid without further
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 980 n.13.
Oct. 22,2002).
Madej v. Schomig, No. 98-C- 1866,2002 WL 31386480, at *1(N.D. I11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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consideration of their effect on the accused's Article 36 rights may be
questionable. Second, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals failed to
consider the constitutional issues regarding whether the ICJ's judgment
automatically takes effect in U.S. courts.
Clearly, the federal court's decision in Madej, while deferring heavily to the
ICJ's interpretation of the VCCR, indirectly reflects concern over the interplay
between international law and domestic law. The court definitively states that
Article 36 creates individually enforceable rights and prohibits strict reliance on
procedural default rules. However, in the end, a petitioner raising an alleged
Article 36 violation has no relief because no conclusion has been reached as to
the proper remedy for an Article 36 violation. This result indirectly reflects
concern over whether Article 36 violations rise to the level of U.S. constitutional
violations. Reliance on constitutional conflicts and the federalist nature of the
U.S. legal system may have provided betterrationale for denying Valdez' claims
in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
XI. Conclusion
Unquestionably, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals faced a difficult
issue in Valdez. The court probably ruled correctly in denying that LaGrandis
binding on Oklahoma courts, and certainly, that LaGrandis binding on state
courts is a difficult argument to make. Of course, though, this is not the only
issue. The federalist nature of the United States might grant states the power to
incorporate ICJ decisions, especially in the absence of a federal position.
Therefore, the issue may be better phrased as whether Oklahoma should follow
LaGrand. Furthermore, the court clearly hesitated to address the issue, and its
reliance on Breardprecluded such considerations. The court could have given
a more reasoned decision if it relied more heavily on domestic-law issues and
the constitutional concerns surrounding the integration of international norms
and judicial decisions into domestic law. Certainly, Article 36 violations will
continue to confront state courts, and the principles espoused in this comment
may provide useful avenues for the incorporation of LaGrandif states desire to
exercise their sovereignty in that manner.
Jeffrey L Green
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